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This article explores the post 2000 national identity formation through the use of national 
heroes narrative and the Heroes’ Acre shrine in Zimbabwe. The Heroes’ Acre marks the 
country’s physical reminder of the past and acts as a tool for national identity and its symbolic 
maintenance through state presided rituals that happen at the shrine. Attached to the Heroes’ 
Acre as a permanent physical symbol of nationhood are the people the burial site was built for 
–the heroes, that is, the ‘war’ dead and the living who participated in the country’s liberation 
‘war’. The argument made in this paper is that the definition and usages of heroes and Heroes’ 
Acre has mutated over the years to suit ZANU-PF’s shifting political agendas. Specifically the 
article addresses questions around conferment of a hero’s status on the dead, access to the 
Heroes’ Acre and the meanings of these to the emotive issue of nurturing a monolithic 
Zimbabwean national identity as imagined by ZANU-PF. The article concludes that the elite’s 
uses of the Heroes’ Acre and heroes’ status which excludes democratic public participation has 
served to carve a skewed and narrow narrative on the meaning of Zimbabweanness meant to 
bolster ZANU-PF’s hegemony. National identities, the article argues, are transient and always 
changing.  
 



























Some of the most potent signifiers of arrival of the new political elite in a postcolonial set-up 
usually brought about by a violent war of liberation are the renaming of significant landmarks, 
dismantlement of colonial monuments and the erection of new ones, representative of the new 
status quo. In Zimbabwe, the national Heroes’ Acre stands imagined as one of the most 
symbolic monuments of prestige, overcoming, decolonisation, resilience, equality, democracy, 
legitimacy and influence. The Heroes’ Acre marks the country’s memory and history while 
standing as a physical reminder and tool for national identity formation and symbolic 
maintenance. Attached to the Heroes’ Acre, as a permanent physical symbol of nationhood, is 
the people the burial site was built for, the ‘war dead’ and the living who participated in the 
‘war’. I prefer using ‘war’ rather than war because Zimbabwe has passed through many 
conflicts each with its own heroes. There are two main wars that have to do with the country’s 
liberation called the First and Second Chimurenga (revolutionary struggles) wars in Shona. 
The Third and ‘Fourth’ Chimurengas are the land reform and economic reform ‘wars’ and it is 
these that have created dubious heroes who are also buried at the Heroes’ Acre rendering both 
the term ‘war’ dead and ‘heroes’ as imagined by ZANU-PF complex. National heroes unlike 
myths, bring to life the belief that for the nation to subsist there were sacrifices and blood-shed. 
This makes the Heroes’ Acre a celebratory and solemn space; where the heroic sacrifices of 
the dead are celebrated at a public burial and yet what they stood for, fought for and the current 
events, especially the post 2000 years are of solemn concern particularly to the ruling elite.  
 
This paper questions the political elite’s uses of the Heroes’ Acre as a sacred national space, 
selection and burial of national heroes in the complex project of national identity construction. 
National identity in the context of this research is taken to mean “a shared structure of feeling, 
a largely imagined consciousness that is reinforced both through life's daily routines as well as 
through ritualised, symbol-laden, celebrations of nationhood” (Thomas 1996, 1). In the case of 
Zimbabwe it has been argued that there is nothing like a cohesive Zimbabwean national identity 
because Zimbabweans as a nation do not exist (Mpofu 2014, Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009, 
Masunungure 2005). This is simply predicated upon the fact that, among other things, even the 
name ‘Zimbabwe’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009), and ‘national’ symbols were imposed on the 
national landscape without public or democratic participation. Thus the post-colonial 
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nationalists failed to ‘create’ the nation-as-a-people but instead succeeded in creating a ‘people-
less’ state. What has been the prime issue for ZANU-PF since 2000 is what Bell (1999), writing 
in the Uzbek context, calls the re-definition of the hegemonic narrative on national identity. 
Heroes and the Heroes’ Acre have been the focal point and theatre for revivifying a ZANU-PF 
imagined Zimbabwean national identity.  
The intention is not to dispute the definitions of heroes and Heroes’ Acre or national identities 
constructed around these but my quest is to critically examine interpretations and narratives 
around these while highlighting inconsistencies and implications they have on the mythic 
notion of Zimbabweanness. Elsewhere, in the article Toxification of national holidays and 
national identity in Zimbabwe's post-2000 nationalism, I discuss the use of national holidays 
as Heroes’ Day and Independence Day as central to commemorative and national identity 
construction rituals (Mpofu 2016). The research focuses on how Zimbabwe’s President Robert 
Mugabe has adulterated and toxified these holidays and the notion of Zimbabweanness through 
commemorating and celebrating these auspicious days in an exclusivist and narrow fashion 
whose only project is the maintenance of Mugabe’s political legitimacy and stranglehold on 
power. The current research takes a different dimension altogether. It does not focus on the 
holidays per se but attempts to focus on the physical aspects on nation-making - the Heroes 
Acre as a symbolic space and the heroes as founders and ancestors of the mythic nation. I pay 
particular attention to the uses of the Heroes’ Acre and heroes’ narratives from Mugabe’s 
speeches and news reports as reported in The Herald between 2000-2015. Mugabe’s speeches 
form executive declarations on the socio-politico and economic direction of the country while 
The Herald acts as a mouthpiece of the Mugabe government (Mpofu, 2016).  
This period is significant as it is the period when President Mugabe’s ruling Zimbabwe African 
National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the party that has ruled Zimbabwe since 1980 
faced a formidable opposition party in all elections for the second time since independence. In 
1980 Nkomo’s Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe African People’s Union (PF-ZAPU) challenged 
Mugabe. The latter’s intolerance for opposition political parties, quest to make Zimbabwe a 
one party-state and alleged tribal-friction led to a genocide that ended in 1987 with the signing 
of the Unity Accord between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU. The post 2000 is also significant in 
Zimbabwean politics as “it is characterised by political and economic crises that have assumed 
global prominence, including a tension filled and shaky Government of National Unity between 
ZANU-PF and the opposition parties between 2009 and 2013” (Mpofu 2016, 28). This period 
has seen national identity, monuments and national holidays being contested assuming a status 
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of objects of socio-political and economic conflicts. The heroes, the ‘controversial’ conferment 
of the hero status by ZANU-PF and eulogies usually given by Mugabe have spoken largely to 
the issues of national sovereignty and the sanctity of the country’s ruler-ship as a preserve 
solely for ZANU-PF.  
National identity as a construct 
The understanding of Zimbabwe national identity in this paper draws from the constructivist 
school of nationalism espoused by theorists like Gellner (1983), Hobsbawm (1990), Anderson 
(1991), Hall (1996) among others. Constructionists see identity formation as a “construction, a 
process never completed—always in process” (Hall, 1996, 210). As Anderson (2006) captures 
some aspects of the role of capitalism in nation-formation in his seminal book, Imagined 
Communities, one can see that the wide belief is that nations are “relatively recent innovations 
tied to the rise of industrial capitalism, and that the states and elites actively create national 
identity around important symbolic events and ideas” (Forest and Johnson, 2002, 526). Using 
print capitalism to make his thesis, Anderson (2006) argues that the emergence and replication 
of the daily ritual of newspaper production and reading in some West European countries 
pointed to print capitalism’s role “in the historical constitution of nations as imagined 
communities” (Brookes, 1999, 248). Undeniably myths, drama and iconography (Duara, 1996) 
were not technologically circulated but these were orally circulated and the net effect was the 
same. Again, most postcolonial African states imagine their postcolonial nationhood along the 
lines of having had and having conquered a common enemy – the settler – as having created 
the nation-as-a-people. 
 
National identities are fluid, contested and complex and therefore we cannot afford to take the 
citizens as passive consumers who when partaking or consuming elite produced ideologies or 
products become part of a community the elite imagines without contesting some of these 
ideologies. However, in this instance of politically controlled spaces where ordinary citizens 
cannot partake in any democratic engagement, this paper argues that there is a one-way 
constructionist approach to the debate; the elite controlled one. ZANU-PF controls and 
dominates the public media and the Heroes’ Acre as a national space and no alternative voices 
are advanced from those two public spaces. Sometimes citizens are frogmarched to the burials 
and other commemorative events at the Heroes’ Acre but they remain disempowered and at the 




ZANU-PF for instance, even though with tendencies of primordially constructing 
Zimbabweanness when it is politically expedient, appeals to many as a modern party using 
modern means to construct the nation. But to do this, it derives political power and legitimacy 
from ancient myths, historical events and characters. A mythic, ancient and timeless Zimbabwe 
disrupted by colonialism in the late 1800s has been engaged with as imagined by ZANU-PF 
for its political survival. In this imagination, ZANU-PF’s dominant discourses suggest that the 
party was inspired by the country’s ancestors deliver independence in 1980. Most narratives 
therefore hinge on this imagination and this has opened up the Zimbabwean national identity 
to be a reflection of the choices made by the powerful political elite who choose “historical 
figures that become national heroes and establish the historical incidents that become the 
formative events of the nation’s identity” (Forest and Johnson 2002, 526).  
 
The Heroes’ Acre’s symbolic meaning and centrality to Zimbabwe-hood has been, to a certain 
extent, modified by ZANU-PF especially after 2000 so as to survive the changes in the political 
landscape outlined above. The Heroes’ Acre has been one of the most important monuments, 
just like artefacts such as the liberation war heroes, whose memory has been used to construct 
a Zimbabwean national identity whose make-up and narratives, according to Verdery (1999), 
writing in a different context,  invoke a sense of timelessness, awe, fear, and uncertainty. This 
usage of artefacts whose memories transcend time, bringing past events to the present, 
according to Forest and Johnson (2002, 526) “makes such objects especially effective in 
mobilizing national movements.”   
 
Finally, Bourdieu’s (1990, 108) characterisation of what he calls “officialisation” where the 
political elite use their symbolic capital intimately linked to behaviours, practices and structures 
is instructive. He argues that officialisation is a process whereby a dominant group like ZANU-
PF for instance “teaches itself and masks from itself its own truth, binds itself by a public 
profession which sanctions and imposes what it utters, tacitly defining the limits of the 
thinkable and unthinkable and so contributing to the maintenance of the social order from 
which it derives its power”. 
 
The public media and the national identity narrative 
In post- 2000 Zimbabwe debates on the Heroes’ Acre and heroes have taken place mostly in 
the media. This article uses heroes and Heroes’ Acre debates by ZANU-PF to demonstrate the 
fragility of ZANU-PF’s national identity project. The public owned and state-controlled media 
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that always give ZANU-PF and President Mugabe’s views on the nation and other subjects 
prominence have been instrumental in advancing ZANU-PFs narrow views on the liberation 
war, national identity, heroes and the Heroes’ Acre as a national monument. They act as 
mouthpieces of the government of the day. To highlight this, the former Minister of 
Information once said about the national broadcaster:  
We want to see a vibrant national public broadcaster that expresses not only our cultural identity and 
diversity but also expresses our national point of view. And we will ensure that ZBC does this without 
making any apologies to anyone and without fearing or favouring anyone. ... It’s very important and the 
recent experiences in terms of how our sovereignty, our values, our history have been attacked through 
the media must be a lesson to all of us (quoted in Ghandi and Jambaya, 2002: 1) 
The reference to the ZBC (Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation) can easily be substituted for 
‘state controlled public media’ which are controlled by the ruling party and function as political 
mouth pieces contrary to the normative roles of public media. The public media are important 
in (uncritically) mythologizing national heroes, Heroes’ Acre as a sacred space and national 
identity as imagined by ZANU-PF in an attempt to play a role at nation-building. Helen Fulton 
buttresses this point when she suggests that the media naturalises certain “values, truths and 
beliefs”- what is called mythologizing (2005, 7). Largely, these truths, beliefs and values are 
controlled by ZANU-PF in its staging, displaying and narration of power around heroes and 
the Heroes’ Acre (Becker 2011, 527). Below I demonstrate the centrality of the media, 
especially The Herald in relaying messages on and about heroes, Heroes’ Acre and national 
identity as encoded by ZANU-PF through heroes’ burials and disputations of hero status. 
 
 
The Heroes’ Acre as a ‘national’ monument 
The Heroes’ Acre is not a neutral national space devoid of any political significance. Those 
considered heroes are buried at this sacred (The Herald 01/10/2010) shrine to accrete certain 
partial meanings to them as signifiers, the Heroes’ Acre as a ‘sacred’ space and certain versions 
of national identity as imagined by ZANU-PF. The shrine is located on a piece of land 
measuring 57 hectares on a ridge in Norton a small town located seven kilometres west of 
Harare. It was designed, financed and built by North Koreans (Becker 2010) and its design 
takes after and two AK 47 rifles lying back to back with the graves symbolizing the magazine. 
What makes it unique is its artistic detail, imposing scale and largely “propagandistic rhetoric” 
(Marschall 2006, 179) whose “many black slabs of memorial granite… concretise[s] a moment 
in a wider project of national inscription” (Werbner 1998, 82). It acts as a model par excellence 
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for any commemorative project especially in Africa. Namibia’s Heroes’ Acre is inspired by the 
Zimbabwean one for example.  
 
When constructing it, it seems as if Mugabe knew that time moved fast and space was going 
to be low and there was therefore need to freeze his liberation war patriotic history and 
nationalist ideologies in space and time. The use of bronze, granite and other weather-enduring 
material meant to resist the “ravages of time” (Osborne, 1998: 434) speaks to this attempt at 
freezing those narratives. Instead of being a faithful witness to the past (Dwyer 2004) the 
national shrine has historically been deceptive as it is a space nationalists have encoded with 
messages that facilitate selective and politically expedient forms of remembering and 
forgetting.  
 
In terms of construction, the shrine has “a tall column, crowned by an Eternal Flame, towers 
above the monument and is intended to symbolise triumphal victory and the desire for 
freedom” (Marschall 2006, 179, see also Werbner 1998) as central to its architecture and the 
elite national identity construction project. Central to the shrine is the trademark Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier, marked by a colossal statue of three heroic soldiers, two males and one 
female, carrying a flag, a rocket launcher and an AK 47 assault rifle. The Unknown Soldier is 
venerated by everyone as “the very lack of an individual identity permits almost everyone to 
claim the Unknown Soldier as his or her own” (Peihler 1994, 175). It represents those 
unaccounted for men and women who left their homes to fight in the liberation struggle. This 
configuration is telling considering the patriarchal and phallic nature of Zimbabwean politics 
and society encapsulated by Mugabe’s amadoda sibili  (real men) philosophy. Mugabe, in his 
fight against neo-colonialism, imagined to be sponsored by the West, business, opposition and 
Brettonwoods institutes has always argued that he needs men with backbone, men who do not 
waver and cannot be bought, the amadoda sibili,  to stand up against these bullies whose agenda 
is regime change.  
 
While the monument exudes pretences of gender inclusivity, it remains exclusive, phallic, 
masculinised, and militaristic in its treatment of women. Just like the Namibian Heroes’ Acre 
where Becker (2011) observes that there are more images of male soldiers in the panels around 
than there are females, the Zimbabwean one too ‘minimises’ the presence and participation of 
women in the liberation war in similar ways it does to those who never went to exile. Where 
women appear, they are carrying babies while men are carrying guns  andwhere the women 
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appear carrying guns; they are muscular, lean, with small breasts (Becker, 2011, 530). The 
emphasis is on colonial brutalities and gendered features while minimising their feminine 
attributes. For example, one mural panel illustrates the brutalities of the colonial soldiers where 
a woman with a baby strapped on her back is brutally beaten by the soldiers while being 
savagely torn by the police dog. This has formed the core of Mugabe’s victimhood and heroic 
narrative about the colonial era. 
 
Further the monument has characteristics of “socialist realist monument[s]” (Coombes 2011, 
206) with two catafalques; one in the front which is used as a ceremonial resting place for a 
dead hero’s casket during the rituals conducted just before official burial while Werbner (1998, 
83) suggests that other one, which has never been used, could be reserved for a “Head of State” 
and there is no guessing that it is meant for Mugabe who is a central figure in the architecture 
of the Heroes’ Acre. Nothing clearly captures this centrality than one of the bronze murals 
which, in the process of representing a romanticised and masculinised historical narrative of 
the liberation struggle, shows what is clearly an aesthetically exaggerated Mugabe – head 
towering others, facial profile clearly defined, looking youthful, innocent, facing ahead in pure 
leadership style. This imposing portrayal has immortalised Mugabe as an embodiment of the 
liberation struggle and a grand teller of the national narrative (Mpofu 2014, 2016).   
 
Osborne is of the opinion that such configurations of monuments render these spaces 
“consensus builders… focal points for identifying with a visual condensation of an imagined 
national chronicle rendered in heroic symbolism” (2001: 16). Opposition politician Paul 
Themba Nyathi points out that Mugabe “appears to use the funerals (conducted at the shrine) 
as a pretext for making major policy statements and to rail against perceived enemies” (2004: 
66). This has led to various perceptions that the monument is used for politically expedient 
rather than nationally inclined purposes.  
 
The Ministry of Information imagines the shrine as a place of pilgrimage for the masses intent 
on creating their own history, designed to “arouse national consciousness, forge national unity 
and identity… the pride of the people of Zimbabwe. A symbol of bravery and selflessness of 
those whose remains are laid to rest there” (Ministry of Information, 1989: 3). On its website, 
the Zimbabwe Tourism Authority advertises and describes the Heroes’ Acre thus:  
[the] …Heroes Acre is a burial ground and national monument … Its… purpose is to commemorate 
Patriotic Front guerrillas killed during the Rhodesian Bush War, and contemporary Zimbabweans whose 




For Savage (1994, 130) monuments and the commemoration of the war dead anchor and 
legitimate “the very notion of collective memory” as key to national identity formation and in 
Zimbabwe this is at the expense of gender, democracy, diversity and inclusivity. Besides the 
Heroes’ Acre, another important and yet contested aspect related to this is the definition of 
heroes and conferment of the hero status on the dead. Below I attempt to define national heroes 
as national identity building blocks. 
Heroes as national symbols 
Besides symbolising national “state narrative” (Osborne, 2001: 15) and unification, the Heroes’ 
Acre has been a symbol of ZANU-PF’s tyranny, authoritarianism, control, protocol in national 
rituals, domination, elitism, top-down decision making and exclusion (Kriger 1995, Mpofu 
2014, 2016). It is a discriminating space where some people are deliberately excluded from 
being buried at the monument on racial, political, sexual orientation or ethnic grounds. Some 
of this is informed by its structural presence which scholars of commemoration and heritage 
studies concur is meant to encode selected historical narratives and memories (Becker, 2011; 
Marschall, 2006; Werbner, 1998) and not only preserve ‘all’ memories from the past (Becker, 
2011; Connerton, 1989). This brings to the fore the definition and qualification one has to hold 
to be a national hero. 
 
Whereas the Heroes’ Acre is probably the most “crucial early part of construction of a national 
identity in the first decade of (Zimbabwe’s) independence” (Onslow, 2011: 4) theorists of 
nationalism suggest that heroes are used as spiritual ancestors, definers and unifiers of the 
imagined national community at every given epoch especially when the national project is 
under strain (Smith 1999, Hutchins 2011, Anderson 2006). Hutchins (2011, 649) posits that 
beyond their nationalist leadership roles, national heroes “retain power long past their lifetimes 
as symbols incarnating national values and character... often ascribed (quasi-) divine roles and 
devotion in the national consciousness”. However, in the Zimbabwean context, different 
methods are used to define and determine heroes. A ‘national hero’ is determined by ZANU-
PF’s top decision making organ, the politburo or by Mugabe personally. While I am alive to 
the fact that like all other myths, the “pantheon of heroes and the meanings attributed to them 
are subject to on-going renegotiation and reinterpretation” (Hutchins, 2011: 650) I argue that 
in the case of Zimbabwe these renegotiations and reinterpretations are more politically 
motivated than rational in nature. Thus the conferment of a hero’s status and access to the 
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shrine at one’s death, more than anything, is used by Mugabe to reward or punish his loyalists 
and enemies respectively, at the expense of fostering national unity. While the heroes and the 
shrine are potential artefacts for creating national unity and identity, they have been 
conspicuously contested especially in online and private media within and outside Zimbabwe.  
 
Contestations of the Heroes’ Acre are not new in Zimbabwe just like disputes on national 
identity are common in most nations. There have been concerns on the way the Heroes’ Acre 
has been used by Mugabe especially by opposition parties and within ZANU-PF. The late 
James Chikerema, Mugabe’s uncle who differed with the latter’s policies also decried the use 
of the Heroes’ Acre “for political mileage by ZANU-PF” (in Buckle, 2002: 103) while the late 
University of Zimbabwe academic Masipula Sithole described the process of hero selection 
and burial as tantamount to “making the Heroes’ Acre a ZANU-PF grave yard. It is no longer 
a Heroes’ Acre [for] genuine heroes” (in Buckle, 2002: 103). The marginalising processes of 
choosing heroes are contested by politicians, academics, the media and ordinary people using 
online media (Mpofu, 2016 forthcoming). This, however is a separate research altogether as 
the agenda here is to trace how ZANU-PF has used the dead heroes and the Heroes’ Acre to 
coin narratives meant to sustain its stranglehold on power and political legitimacy.  
 
The ZANU-PF script on the Heroes’ Acre and heroes  
 
The Heroes’ Acre and the rituals of burial of heroes are intimately linked to the country’s 
liberation, independence and national identity. The Heroes’ Acre is an important venue for the 
latter and Heroes’ Day commemorations and both events are usually presided over by President 
Mugabe – a central insider to the myth of nationhood, patriotism and birth of the nation. 
Evidence suggests that around two thirds of the heroes buried at the shrine are ZANU-PF and 
members while many more worthy candidates continue to be ignored based on sexuality, 
political ideology, race or even ethnicity. This has led to the contestation of the space, definition 
of a hero and conflicting versions on and of national identity. Some heroes have refused to be 
buried at the shrine calling it tainted. As of July 2015, Zimbabwe had 122 declared national 
heroes and heroines 12 of which were not buried at the shrine.  
 
Heroes and nationhood 
Mugabe sees a hero as a “revolutionary who fought oppression... against the resolute will of 
the unjust and powerful… political and economic calculations… of the oppressor nations of 
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the West” (The Herald, 13/07/2002). In an opinion piece about the late Vice Prsident Joseph 
Msika, ‘Msika the definition of the hero,’ The Herald (09/08/2009) defines a hero as “ 
protector, defender or guardian [and this] is fitting for Cde Msika’s life which was dedicated 
to protecting, defending and guarding the interests of Zimbabwe and its people”. This 
summarised the narrow understanding of the hero by the public media and ZANU-PF. One 
conspicuous addition to this definition is unquestioning loyalty to ZANU-PF regardless of the 
party’s mutations into an increasingly intolerant movement that ruthlessly deals with 
opponents. In one feature article The Herald argues that:  
 
Coincidentally… all true heroes belong to one party, ZANU-PF... This party with its purported sins 
organised, fought and liberated this country. So in terms of patriotism ZANU-PF and its cadres 
demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that they are patriotic. However, when ZANU-PF or its 
cadres celebrate this unquestionably proud legacy they are accused of personalising the struggle or 
restricting patriotism to a political party. (29/08/2011).  
 
True Zimbabweans are therefore expected to see heroes as role models, follow in their footsteps 
and be loyal to ZANU-PF.  
 
In a speech on the burial of Bernard Chidzero, a former ZANU-PF Member of Parliament and 
Minister of Finance in Mugabe’s cabinet, at the Heroes’ Acre, Mugabe told Zimbabweans to 
“examine themselves to see if they are defending the sovereignty and independence of the 
country, which the heroes died fighting for or toiled to uphold after independence” (The 
Herald, 13/08/2002). Thus heroes are those that fought for the country and later served the 
party and country after independence. The dead heroes are venerated and Zimbabweans are 
implored to gain inspiration from the knowledge that they sacrificed their lives for the birth of 
the mythic ‘Zimbabwean’ nation. The suggestion in such narratives is that most ZANU-PF 
members who fought in the liberation war later ‘selflessly’ served Zimbabwe after 
independence. This is far from the truth as the postcolonial state has been treated – vulture style 
– as a site for ‘eating’, that is, self-aggrandizement by those in and connected to the leadership 
structures of ZANU-PF.  
 
The prevalent representations and memorialisations of heroes in a narrow sense imagined by 
Mugabe strips some of the heroes off of their heroism. For instance Mugabe says  of ‘Father 
Zimbabwe’, Joshua Nkomo: “[I]f Joshua Nkomo were to rise this hour, would you be fit to 
hold his hand and walk in step with him down the path that emanates from the very sacred 
shrine  and ends in the great future for our country?” (The Herald, 13.08.02). Nkomo, the 
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mythic founder of the struggle and ancestor of the nation did not stand for what Mugabe stands 
for especially in the post 2000 Zimabbwe. The current Mugabe regime is characterised by 
corruption, intolerance and willingness to use violence to solve political differences something 
Nkomo was against. The assumption in the quote above is that Mugabe and his loyalists would 
get approval from Nkomo to do as they will but it’s on record that Nkomo not only fought 
against colonialism but was also against black leaders, his “former colleagues in the liberation 
struggle,” (1984, xiii) oppressing the majority as expressed in his biography The story of my 
life. In April 1986 at the burial of Lookout Masuku, the ZIPRA ex-commander, Nkomo further 
demonstrated where he stood in terms of postcolonial politics  in relation to human rights and 
good governance; characteristics not synonymous with ZANU-PF’s style of governance. He 
attacked postcolonial leaders for corruption and authoritarianism. Kriger quotes Nkomo as 
saying “We accused and condemned the White minority… for creating a police state and yet 
we exceed them when we create a military state. We accused the former colonisers who used 
detention without trial as well as torture and yet we do exactly… if not worse” (1995, 152). 
 
Mugabe’s appropriation of Nkomo’s memory is illustrative of inconsistencies of ZANU-PF’s 
nationalist project predicated on using national heroes and the Heroes’ Acre monument to gain 
political legitimacy and maintain its hegemony. Nkomo was Mugabe’s ‘former’ sworn enemy 
and has been used by ZANU-PF after death, amidst popular disenchantment among 
Zimbabweans with the status quo, to unify the nation – something politically expedient only to 
Mugabe and ZANU-PF. In most nationalist narratives, especially those soon after 
independence, Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (PF-ZAPU) and its military wing 
the Zimbabwe People’s Revolution Army (ZIPRA) were relegated and edited out of the 
country’s liberation narrative (Martin and Johnson 1981) only to be reinserted when it suits 
Mugabe.  
 
A critical analysis of the above speaks to tensions in Zimbabwean politics during the liberation 
struggle and this makes one understand continued crises of Zimbabwean national identity 
project. The reinsertion of Nkomo, PF-ZAPU and ZIPRA into the narrative saw Nkomo being 
elevated to sainthood and celebrated as ‘Father Zimbabwe’ by Mugabe and ZANU-PF when 
in the early 1980s he was denigrated as ‘father of dissidents,’ ‘big-bellied Ndebele King’ and 
a ‘cobra whose head was supposed to be crushed’ by Mugabe and his supporters. Further, 
Mugabe adds that anyone who does anything contrary to what the heroes (and by extension 
ZANU-PF) ‘stand’ for or opposes its hegemony is “a willing traitor and second executioner of 
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these heroes, a willing posthumous betrayer of their cause, indeed the eager butcher of the 
revolution, our heritage and of the future of our children” (The Herald, 13.08.02). 
Further, heroes are mythologised as forming the pith of the nation. An example of this is 
Mugabe’s statement at the burial of Vice President Simon Muzenda who was seen as “an 
emancipator of the people… maker of the nation, it’s very throbbing soul … its guardian, its 
revolutionary spirit which cruel fate sought to destroy that dark afternoon of September 20, 
2003” (The Herald, 25.11.2003). Mugabe speaks in the backdrop of a massive challenge to 
ZANU-PFs hegemony by the opposition MDC and his sentiments have to be intertextually read 
with the post 2000 political economy of decline. Deaths of heroes therefore are not the end but 
a continuation of the construction of the nation from another ‘world’. Heroes “function as moral 
beacons, behavioural models and representations of [the nation’s] beliefs and self-conception” 
(Hutchins, 2011: 650). Even after death, heroes are spoken to and hear ‘us’ since they are 
immortal. For instance, Mugabe addressed Chenjerai Hunzvi while he lay in the casket thus 
“[T]o you Hunzvi I say: you have done your part, you have fought your struggle… gallantly, 
staunchly defending your birth right and your revolutionary heritage. You indeed deserve the 
halo of a national hero” (The Herald, 19.06.2001). The subtext is that the listeners must follow 
in the heroes’ footsteps and defend the nation from possible colonisation by the British through 
the opposition parties. 
 
Hunzvi who allegedly did not participate in the liberation war, gained notoriety as the leader 
of the war veterans and the trail of destruction he left to the Zimbabwean socio-political and 
economic landscape which outweighs any reasons one may give for his hero status. He was 
declared a hero therefore for assisting ZANU-PF maintain political power through coordinating 
and participating in the party’s violent electoral campaigns and violent land reform. He is also 
known for looting the war victims’ compensation fund together with some well-connected 
ZANU-PF officials including their relatives. Hunzvi is part of what Ndlovu-Gatsheni and 
Willems (2009, 958) call the ‘new’ heroes; those who did not participate in the liberation war. 
They however participated in what later became known as the Third Chimurenga – war for 
land – waged against commercial farmers leading to the violent seizures of white owned land. 
This chaotic land repossession process had three main achievements. First was the partial 
provision of land and fulfilment of the aspirations of those who fought in the liberation war; 
and that is land ownership. Second, land was used as an identity marker and political tool by 
ZANU-PF. Third, some of those who were active during this Third Chimurenga became the 
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‘new’ heroes – rewards from Mugabe for helping him stay in power. The myth of heroism of 
those declared national heroes seems to be determined by what good they do for ZANU-PF 
and not for Zimbabweans as a whole hence, to a certain extent, the true measure of heroism is 
unquestioning loyalty to party principles. 
A hero, according is “part of the national symbolism” (The Herald 08/08/2002), one who 
went to prison, experienced the wrath of the colonialists and was consistent in supporting the 
party until death. In a story ‘Chinamano laid to rest,’ The Herald quotes the acting President 
Joseph Msika who presided over the burial describing the late heroine Ruth Chinanamano 
thus:  
as a fearless and dedicated freedom fighter whose spirit and determination the Rhodesians failed to break. 
In the streets where we demonstrated and fought pitched battles with the Rhodesians… Ruth was there 
in the thick of things… She knew the inside of Gonakudzingwa, that notorious detention centre which 
broke the mettle of many nationalists, including male ones who fell by the wayside, but left her unbowed. 
(The Herald 07/01/2005). 
Some salient aspects could be observed here. By fighting and enduring the harsh detention 
conditions, Chinamano encroaches into the male domain and the mere fact that resilience is 
imagined as a male characteristic speaks to the ‘patriachalisation’ of the liberation war alluded 
to earlier. In addition, a hero, as already alluded to before, must have fought in the liberation 
war and endured prison time. One of the most repeated attributes of being a hero is what 
ZANU-PF calls being “committed to the principles and values of the party” both before and 
after independence (The Herald 07/01/2005). The conflation of the state and party has been 
resourceful to ZANU-PF especially in the post 2000s when its hegemony has been under 
scrutiny and has been challenged by opposition parties and ordinary citizens. This was also 
tested during the Government of National Unity (GNU) between ZANU-PF and two MDC 
opposition parties. The MDC contested the selection of the heroes and usages of the Heroes’ 
Acre as a ZANU-PF shrine. In a story ‘House debates heroism status’ The Herald reports:  
There was heated debate in the House of Assembly yesterday over conferment of national hero status. 
MDC members alleged lack of consistency in the manner heroes are declared while their Zanu-PF 
counterparts said those who deserved to be declared national heroes had been duly accorded the status… 
Luveve representative Mr Reggie Moyo… argued that people from Matabeleland were being sidelined 
when it came to conferment of national hero status. (The Herald 14/06/2011) 
 
Besides advancing the common tales of heroism, ZANU-PF also takes available opportunities 
to point out the moral degeneracy of those considered villains starting from the colonialists 
who are described as “oppressor nations of the west” (The Herald 13/08/2002), “the white 
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settlers” (The Herald 07/01/2005), “colonial oppressors,” looters and “plunderers” (The Herald 
08/08/2009) or “foreigners’ (The Herald 14/04/2011). This creation of a common enemy is 
meant to create unity among Zimbabweans. 
These representations and narratives on heroes partly inform the post 2000 ‘war’ between 
Mugabe and the West. Most narratives in the public media, just like Mugabe’s speeches at 
various fora like addresses at the Heroes’ Acre during the burials spoke to this tension. For 
example, The Herald (15/08/2011) believes that “the West has been at war with the people of 
Zimbabwe, as with the rest of the African continent, because the British wanted to negate the 
Truth of the people’s ownership of their God-given resources”. In a story ‘Mugabe humbles 
Blair’ The Herald celebrates Mugabe’s speech at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg in 2002 where Mugabe told the former British Prime Minister 
to stop meddling in Zimbabwe’s internal affairs. The report went thus:  
This was probably his finest moment in history as he hogged international limelight on all major 
television networks, newspapers, radio talk shows and news agency reports. In just 10 minutes he had 
devastated the entire Western coalition against Zimbabwe and given the Third World a new voice to 
speak with boldness against neo-colonialism being brought in the name of globalisation and 
democracy… This has exposed the British machinations against Zimbabwe and its hate sanctions 
campaign based on blatant lies… What the speech has achieved more than anything else is the message 
that firstly, Zimbabwe is a truly free country and will die protecting its sovereignty. Secondly, the land 
reform programme is here to stay. (The Herald 04/09/2002) 
Mugabe’s speeches have consistently alluded to the fact that “We are not for sale, Zimbabwe 
is not for sale… not for the highest bidder and let Mr Blair hear… we are not for the British 
bidder” and this has been complimented by some of the banners (obviously printed by ZANU-
PF) which castigate the so-called illegal sanctions while mourning the dead heroes. Messages 
such as “Sanctions, Public Enemy Number One”, “You served your country well” and “Zorora 
Murugare Mwana Wevhu” (chiShona for rest in peace son of the soil), “Zimbabwe is a 
sovereign state we will defend it with our blood” (14 April 2011) are used to engender feelings 
of patriotism and amplify government redistributive policies. “Uniting against sanctions”, 
“Pamberi nekudzikisa mutengo” (chiShona for Forward with reducing retail prices), 
“Economic saboteurs do not have a place in Zimbabwe”, “Africa's cause is our cause” and 
“Zimbabwe will never be a colony again” (The Herald 14/07/2007) are illustrative. According 
to the United States, it imposed economic sanctions on some individuals serving in Mugabe’s 
regime “in 2003 as a result of the actions and policies of certain members of the Government 
of Zimbabwe and other persons undermining democratic institutions and processes in 
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Zimbabwe” (US Embassy Harare, online). However, the implementation and effects of these 
sanctions on the Zimbabwean economy and society at large is debatable (Mpofu 2014).  
The Heroes’ Acre and nationhood 
The Heroes’ Acre is meant to embody the ethos of liberation war in an enduring form. Its 
construction out of resistant materials like granite gives the liberation memory longevity. 
Moreover, as Young (1999, 6) suggests, the state’s memory locus is naturalised and “its ideals 
and founding myths are cast as naturally true as the landscape in which they stand” as possible. 
Moreover, the most reiterated theme in memory studies runs almost in agreement to 
Appelfeld’s claim that “[M]emory is elusive and selective: it holds onto what it chooses to hold 
on to… Very like a dream, memory takes specific details out of the viscous flow of events…” 
(2004: v). This memory is open to manipulation as ZANU-PF has done in an attempt to survive 
the hostile domestic political climate where its legitimacy is questioned. Zelinsky (in Osborne, 
2001: 7) believes modern nations like Zimbabwe “could neither exist nor operate effectively 
without an adequate body of symbol and myth” (1989: 13) partly because the postcolonial 
nation-as-a-people does not exist.   
In a recent article in The Herald, the heroes acre: 
 
…carries the richness of a people struggle against the brutal oppressive regime. There lies the leadership 
of a people’s revolution, those who sacrificed their life to bring change in Zimbabwe politics thereby 
shaping not only the country’s developmental pattern but also the region... [It is also a space where] we 
cherish our history as learning from it can help foster national unity which is one of the aims of the 
National Heroes Acre. This monument serves as an education centre for students, ordinary Zimbabweans 
and tourists from abroad about a major part of this nation’s history. (The Herald 15/07/2015) 
At the beginning of what is currently known as the Zimbabwe ‘crisis’ Mugabe said the Heroes’ 
Acre was a “scared shrine that was home to the country's fine citizens endowed with selfless 
qualities of humanity”. Mugabe’s spokesman Charles Charamba, writing under the pseudonym 
Nathaniel Manheru clarified what these fine citizens were when he described the National 
Heroes’ Acre as:  
... not a facility for bleaching darkened political souls. It is a site and recognition of honour: 
honour irrevocably achieved and thus honour which cannot be reversed or undone through 
subsequent transgressions. ZANU-PF, the sole creator of that Acre … sole author of rules of 
entry to that shrine, relies on death for this irrevocability. (The Herald 28.08.2010) 
 
Thus a ‘darkened soul’ seems to be the one that does not belong to ZANU-PF. Regardless of 
that darkened soul’s contribution to the fight against colonialism or tyranny in postcolonial 
Zimbabwe, it cannot gain entry into the Heroes’ Acre, a space ZANU-PF appropriates as its 
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own.  The darkened soul is also referred to as a stooge or sell-out as reported by The Herald 
which cites Mugabe as saying that the Heroes’ Acre is “not for sellouts, but patriotic 
Zimbabweans who sacrificed their lives to liberate the country from the colonial white regime” 
(21/02/2013). The emphasis seems to be on that the Heroes’ Acre is meant for those who fought 
against the colonial regime. 
 
The imaginations of the Heroes’ Acre as integral to the founding of the nation and important 
for national unity has been a major theme since the beginning of the 2000s. The following 
extract from a report ‘Leave us alone — President tells West’ in The Herald (14/04/2011) 
illustrates this: 
President Mugabe yesterday slammed Europeans for their continued meddling in the country’s internal 
affairs saying Zimbabwe is a sovereign State with the right to determine its own destiny. The President, 
who was speaking at the burial of Cde Menard Livingstone Muzariri at the National Heroes Acre, 
challenged Zimbabweans to be vigilant in the face of continued aggression by Western powers. 
 
This period has seen Mugabe constantly fighting the West, MDC and other imagined enemies 
while calling on Zimbabweans to be patriotic and defend the country as did the heroes buried 
at the national Heroes’ Acre. The following quotation from Mugabe demonstrates this 
argument: “We must be ready to defend our country, sacrifice our lives as many who fought 
the struggle did” (The Herald, 14/04/2011). In addition, since 2000 the Heroes’ Acre has been 
used as a forum to advance certain narratives on indigenisation and the land. Notice how 
Mugabe ‘celebrates’ and encourages the indigenisation process that followed the land reform 
at a burial of ZANU-PF’s Ephraim Masawi at the Heroes’ Acre: 
We are an independent country now. Our resources are ours. They belong to Zimbabweans… the sons 
and daughters of Zimbabwe and those who want to share the resources must get our permission to do so. 
We must agree that they come as partners and come as partners in a manner we define and not in a 
manner they define. The manner we defined is quite straightforward — Zimbabweans should have major 
shareholding in whatever enterprises… Some of our trained young people have been conditioned to 
worshipping the white men working as CEOs in white men’s enterprises whether its Anglo-American or 
Rio Tinto, this is now old fashioned. You were born again in 1980. You are now the masters and those 
who made you CEOs should now be your CEOs (The Herald, 01/10/2010) 
 
In 2011 Mugabe further clarified ZANU-PF’s transition from the land reform to economic 
indigenisation. At the burial of Menard Livingstone Muzariri at the Heroes’ Acre he reiterated 
that the control of Zimbabwe’s resources was important in maintaining the country’s 
sovereignty. 
 
If our economy is controlled by outsiders, our politics will similarly be controlled by outsiders . . . That 
is why we want our people to have economic power so that the political power we have secured through 
the barrel of the gun is economic based. If there is no economic base then that independence is weak, 
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that is why we have the indigenisation policy so that our resources are controlled and owned by us so 
that they benefit the majority of our people (The Herald, 14/04/2011) 
 
The Heroes’ Acre also “embodies prescriptions for future behaviour,” (Fisher, 2010: 88) when, 
as Mugabe’s pronouncements from there urge people to uphold the values of the nation as did 
such heroes as “Leopold Takawira, Chairman Herbert Chitepo, General Josiah Magama 
Tongogara, Jason Moyo, Nikita Mangena… The Old Man, Tangwena” (The Herald, 
08/08/2009). These heroes and those members dedicated to ZANU-PF are portrayed as 
paragons of nationalist decorum to be emulated by ordinary citizens. During these rituals of 
national identity formation, ZANU-PF speaks and demands respect for the heroes ‘in the 
interest of the nation,’ calling people to be patriotic and dedicated cadres prepared to defend 
the nation “against the resolute will of the unjust and powerful, against the political and 
economic calculations and dictates of oppressor nations of the West, now the European Union 
and America” (The Herald, 08/08/2009). 
 
This is further substantiated by Gillis (1994: 3) who states that the state’s presentation of 
“bureaucracy of memory” gives a “sense of sameness over time and space” by perpetrating 
what Osborne (2001: 9) calls “systems of remembering and forgetting that … favour elite 
memory over popular memory”. As such, the national shrine and burial of heroes form an 
important site and rituals respectively for ZANU-PF to advance certain notions of nationhood, 
search for political legitimacy and defend itself from perceived enemies. The outcome of 
ZANU-PF’s narrative on heroes and the Heroes’ Acre is the consistency in pointing out 
enemies and friends of the nation, the role of the liberation history and memory in the 
construction of the nation and expected behaviours from citizens.  
The commemorations and burial of the heroes are underlined by Mugabe’s speeches where the 
themes of victimhood and heroism are used to locate ZANU-PF at the core of liberation history 
and postcolonial nation-making and its survival (Mpofu 2016). The themes of oppression and 
victimhood that Mugabe usually refers to when speaking about colonialism and Zimbabwe’s 
sovereignty are embedded in the iconic graphical illustrations on some panels at the Heroes’ 
Acre which show white Rhodesian forces attacking helpless blacks, especially women. Similar 
attacks are extended to the nation by the West through what ZANU-PF has generally referred 
to as evil economic sanctions. This helps divert people’s attention from the real issues affecting 




At the core of Zimbabwe’s problems though is a complex interplay of issues and not just a 
“simplified picture of a monolithic neo-patrimonial power structure” (Zamponi, 2005: 31). The 
formation of the MDC in 1999 presented a challenge to ZANU-PF’s hegemony and the latter 
plunged the country into a crisis as it used redistributive measures and violence to maintain its 
stranglehold on power, in turn affecting the identity terrain in Zimbabwe – creating the mythic 
insiders and outsiders to the nation characterised by patriotic and unpatriotic tendencies 
respectively. Eliminating from national belonging those who disagree seems to have been 
ZANU-PF’s preferred strategy. For Chikuhwa (2004: 57) Zimbabwe has become a military 
and police dictatorship “where court orders are ignored and defied by those sworn to defend 




That the national hero status and the Heroes’ Acre are symbols and spaces associated with 
power, prestige and legitimacy is beyond debate. From the foregoing it is clear that the post 
2000 Zimbabwean political events have made it almost impossible for ZANU-PF to maintain 
certain narratives in search of its legitimacy without using the Heroes’ Acre and national heroes 
as central symbols. Despite almost losing its appeal especially to the young generations whose 
definitions of heroes most likely conflict with those of ZANU-PF, the ruling party has managed 
to keep the issue of the country’s liberation, current status under attack by the West and its 
successes regarding the land reform and economic emancipation relevant to Zimbabweanness. 
What is clear from the narratives is that the heroes have demonstrated what it means to be 
patriotic and set for those remaining examples to follow. As one of the few remaining liberation 
war ‘heroes’ and iconic founder of the nation Mugabe has become the living national ancestor 
who militarily personifies and tells the grand narratives, relates the myths and brings to life 
memories of liberation war and nation-making. By occupying the centre stage during funerals, 
Mugabe becomes an authority on issues of national construction. He is connected, intimately, 
both to the living and the dead. In the process, he uses the funerals of heroes and their burial at 
the shrine to advance narrow and sectarian political views leading to an advancement and 
appeal for adoption of a limiting and exclusivist brand of national identity. National identities 
are fluid and change from time to time depending on the socio-political and economic 
environment and attempts by ZANU-PF to impose an elite defined brand of national identity 
is problematic. This article has also demonstrated some problems and internal inconsistencies 
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with ZANU-PFs nation-making project. For instance, it is not a far-fetched conclusion that 
ZANU-PF has deferred people’s dreams born at independence. Despite some positive 
contributions, ZANU-PF’s legacy to Zimbabwe is overshadowed by corruption, xenophobia, 
tribalism, racism, violence, human rights violations and suppression of dissent. Most of these 
have been advanced through the use of the narratives surrounding the liberation war memory 
as linked to national heroes and the Heroes’ Acre to seek legitimacy, justify ZANU-PF’s 
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